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SCIENCE: AUGUSTINIAN OR DUHEMIAN?
Alvin Plantinga

This paper is a continuation of a discussion with Ernan McMullin; its topic
is the question how theists (in particular, Christian theists) should think
about modern science-the whole range of modern science, including economics, psychology, sociobiology and so on. Should they follow Augustine
in thinking that many large scale scientific projects as well as intellectual
projects generally are in the service of one or the other of the civitates? Or
should they follow Duhem, who (at least in the case of physics)held that
proper science is independent of metaphysical, theological or (broadly) religious concerns? The focus of the discussion is biology; I support the
Augustinian line of thought, while McMullin is more inclined to the
Duhemian. I conclude by defending the idea that the epistemic probability
of the Grand Evolutionary Scenario on Christian theism together with the
empirical evidence is somewhat less than 1/2.

One of the most spectacular intellectual developments of the last 400
years has been the rise of modern science. Science has of course transformed our lives (both for good and ill). It is also, however, an intellectual process and structure boasting magnificent depth, power and beauty-due, in large part, to its cooperative nature, the way in which hundreds of people can work together and take advantage of each others
results. Modern science took root and flourished in the soil of Christian
theism, nourished by the Christian belief that both we and the world
were created by the same personal, conscious, and intelligent God-a
God, furthermore, who created us in his image, thus enabling us to
resemble him in the capacity to form true beliefs and acquire knowledge
of the world. 1 Nevertheless relations between science and Christian
belief have often been a bit strained, most particularly since the development of evolutionary biology beginning in the nineteenth century. And
a fundamental question for a Christian theist-in particular, one who
takes the Bible as authoritative-is this: how should we think about science generally? If there appears to be a conflict between a Christian
belief and some bit of contemporary science, what should we do?
Which (if either) should we jettison or modify? More specifically, how
should we think about evolutionary biology? Suppose you are a
Christian: should that make a difference to how you think about or pracFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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tice science in general? That's the broad underlying question; there is
also a more specific and perhaps more poignant question, namely, how
should a Christian theist think about evolutionary biology?
I addressed this latter question in "When Faith and Reason Clash:
Evolution and the Bible" (1991a). Ernan McMullin found himself in considerable disagreement and responded with "Plantinga's Defense of
Special Creation" (1991), to which I replied with "Evolution, Neutrality,
and Antecedent Probability: A Reply to van Till and McMullin" (1991b);2
McMullin's riposte was "Evolution and Special Creation" (1993)3. I note
with pleasure the deep underlying agreement between McMullin and
myself; nevertheless there remain some points of equally deep difference. These issues are of great importance, both intrinsically and for the
intellectual health of the Christian community; I therefore propose to
continue the discussion. However I shall forgo line by line self-exculpation in order to look at some of the issues from a perspective untrammeled by the need to prove that wherever McMullin and I disagree, he
must of course be wrong. In part I, I shall address some issues revolving
around the notion of Augustinian science; in part II, I shall briefly address
the question of the antecedent and consequent probability of the Grand
Evolutionary Scenario, given Christian theism as background belief.
I Augustinian Science

According to St. Augustine, human history is the arena of a great contest, a struggle or conflict between two profoundly opposed forces.
Augustine spoke of the City of God and the Earthly City or City of the
World: the Civitas Dei and the Civitas Mundi. In 1991a and elsewhere 4 T
argued that there is indeed such a struggle or competition: as a matter of
fact it is a three-way contest between theism, perennial naturalism, and
creative anti-realism. I argued that the sciences are by no means wholly
neutral with respect to this contest; much of what goes on in them-particularly in the so-called human sciences including economics, psychology, sociology, political science, parts of sociobiology, etc., but also in
biology-proceeds from the assumption of a sort of metaphysical or religious naturalism. (Put simply but vaguely, metaphysical naturalism is
the view that nature is all there is: there is no such person as God or anyone at all like him.S) But this means that the Christian community can't
automatically take the word of the scientific experts; sometimes what the
experts say presupposes a philosophical or religious stance quite
opposed to that of Christian theism. I therefore suggested the Christian
community needs two things here. First, it needs cultural criticism, or
perhaps consciousness raising, which is a matter of coming to a clear
vision of the ways in which metaphysical naturalism ingresses into science-or at any rate into what is ordinarily called science. And second,
the Christian community ought to think about the subject matter of the
various sciences-again, in particular the human sciences, but also to
some degree the so-called natural sciences-from an explicitly theistic or
Christian point of view. It should do so, of course, only where that is
relevant: only where it looks as if thinking about the matter at hand
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from that point of view might lead to conclusions or emphases different
from those ordinarily to be found. I suggested calling the result
'Unnatural Science', or 'Creation Science', or Theistic Science'. A better
name, I think, is "Augustinian Science", which recalls Augustine's suggestion that serious intellectual activity in general is ordinarily in the
service of a broadly religious vision of the world.
A. Why do we Need Augustinian Science?
Fundamentally, because much of what goes on in the sciences is quite
unsatisfactory, seriously flawed from the perspective of Christian theism. There are many examples, especially from psychology, sociology,
sociobiology, political science, and other areas of the human sciences.
Here I give one from sociobiology and a couple from evolutionary biology, the area where the disagreement between McMullin and me has
been focused.

1. Simon and Rationality
According to Herbert Simon/ there is a problem with altruistic behavior, the sort characteristic of Mother Teresa, or The Little Sisters of the
Poor, or the Jesuit missionaries of the 17th century, or the Methodist
missionaries of the 19th. The rational way to behave, says Simon, is to
act or try to act in such a way as to increase one's personal fitness, i. e.,
to act so as to increase the probability that one's genes will be widely
disseminated in the next and subsequent generations, thus doing well in
the evolutionary derby.7 Mother Teresa and The Little Sisters, however,
show very little interest in the propagation of their genes; this behavior
clearly requires explanation; so what is its explanation? Simon proposes
two mechanisms: "bounded rationality", and" docility":
Docile persons tend to learn and believe what they perceive others in the society want them to learn and believe. Thus the content of what is learned will not be fully screened for its contribution to personal fitness (p. 1666).
Because of bounded rationality, the docile individual will often be
unable to distinguish socially prescribed behavior that contributes
to fitness from altruistic behavior. In fact, docility will reduce the
inclination to evaluate independently the contributions of behavior to fitness. . ... By virtue of bounded rationality, the docile person cannot acquire the personally advantageous learning that provides the increment, d, of fitness without acquiring also the altruistic behaviors that cost the decrement, c (p. 1667).
The idea is that a Mother Teresa displays "bounded rationality"; she
adopts those culturally transmitted altruistic behaviors without making
an independent evaluation of their contribution to her personal fitness.
If she did make such an independent evaluation (and were clever
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enough to do it properly) she would see that this sort of behavior does
not contribute to her personal fitness, drop it like a hot potato, and get to
work on increasing her fitness (perhaps by sponsoring a contest, among
her younger relatives, to see who can have the most children).
But isn't this in clear conflict with Christian teachings about what it is
rational for human beings to do? Behaving like Mother Teresa is not at
all a manifestation of "bounded rationality"-as if, if she thought about
the matter with greater clarity and penetration, she would instead act so
as to increase her personal fitness. Behaving as she does is instead a
manifestation of a Christ-like spirit; she is reflecting in her limited
human way the splendid glory of Christ's sacrificial action in the
Atonement. Indeed, is there any sense of 'rational' in which, from a
Christian perspective, there is anything at all a human being can do that
is more rational than what she does?
Of course we might be tempted to claim that Simon's project really
isn't science; but can we sensibly make that claim in these post-Kuhnian
days? If the scientists call it science and get grants from the National
Science Foundation for doing it, if it is published in scientific journals
and written in that stiff, impersonal style characteristic of them, can we
sensibly claim that it really isn't science? So here we have an example of
a scientific project that, from a Christian perspective, is wholly misguided. It is, perhaps, a particularly flagrant example, but there are many
others in the same neighborhood. 8
2. Randomness and design

The next examples are taken from evolutionary biology, the specific
area under dispute between McMullin and me. One of the most conspicuous examples of serious confusion on the part of some of the experts is
the claim that current evolutionary theory demonstrates, or at any rates
supports, the claim that human beings are not the product of intelligent
design; they have not been designed by God or anyone else. A number
of the most prominent writers on evolution unite in declaring that evolutionary biology reveals a substantial element of randomness or chance in
the origin and development of the human species; therefore, human
beings (so they claim) have not been designed. Stephen Gould writes:
"Before Darwin, we thought that a benevolent God had created US."9
Gould's sentiments are expressed less tersely by Douglas Futuyma:
By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind,
uncaring process of natural selection Darwin made theological
or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous.
Together with Marx's materialistic theory of history and society
and Freud's attribution of human behavior to processes over
which we have little control, Darwin's theory of evolution was a
crucial plank in the platform of mechanism and materialism-of
much of science, in short-that has since been the stage of most
Western thought. 10
Clearer yet, perhaps, is George Gaylord Simpson:
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Although many details remain to be worked out, it is already
evident that all the objective phenomena of the history of life
can be explained by purely naturalistic or, in a proper sense of
the sometimes abused word, materialistic factors. They are
readily explicable on the basis of differential reproduction in
populations (the main factor in the modern conception of natural selection) and of the mainly random interplay of the known
processes of heredity. ... Man is the result of a purposeless and
natural process that did not have him in mind.l1
The same claim is made by Richard Dawkins:
All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature
is the blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special
way. A true watchmaker has foresight: he designs his cogs and
springs, and plans their interconnections, with a future purpose
in his mind's eye. Natural selection, the blind, unconscious
automatic process which Darwin discovered, and which we
now know is the explanation for the existence and apparently
purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no
mind and no mind's eye. It does not plan for the future. It has
no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play
the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker. 12
These writers, therefore, unite in declaring that modern evolutionary science has given us powerful reason to believe that human beings are, in
an important way, merely accidental; that there are such creatures as
human beings (creatures with the properties human beings display) is
fortuitious, a matter of chance. There wasn't any plan, any foresight,
any mind, any mind's eye involved in their coming into being or displaying the properties they have.
Now this is initially surprising: how would an empirical science show
something like that? Could there be empirical evidence for it? But in fact
there is confusion here. Evolutionary science speaks of 'randomness':
random genetic mutation, for example. Now these events are 'random'
in something like the sense of not arising from the proper function of the
organism; more specifically, they are not a result of the organism's functioning in accord with any part of its design plan aimed at promoting or
preserving its welfare. Thus Ernst Mayr: "The term, when applied to
variation, means that it is not in a response to the needs of the organism".
But the conclusion the above writers draw depends upon taking 'random' in a much stronger sense, a sense entailing not supervised, orchestrated, caused, or planned by God. As far as I can see, they simply confuse these
two senses, leaping lightly from one to the other. This simple confusion,
obviously, has enormous capacity for mischief; it can lead the unwary to
think science has somehow shown that human beings were not designed
by God and that their most crucial and characteristic capacities have
arisen, not by way of divine design, but by way of chance or accident.
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Someone might reply that the evidence for a theory is in its success,
and evolutionary theory, taken with the stronger sense of 'random', is a
highly successful theory with much empirical confirmation. By way of
response, note that there are two versions of the relevant scientific theory here. The first and stronger version includes the claim that random
events in the strong sense (the sense that entails being unplanned by
God) playa crucial role in evolution; the second and weaker makes the
same claim with respect to random events in the weaker sense of 'random'. Now consider the conjunction of the weak theory with the denial
of the strong; and note that this conjunction is supported by the evidence at least as firmly as is the strong theory itself. Hence the evidence
supports the strong theory no more firmly than its denial; hence it doesn't give us a reason to believe that theory as opposed to its denial. You
might as well argue for theism by conjoining it with, say, relativity theoryor quantum mechanics, pointing out that the resulting conjunction is
empirically adequate; few, I take it, would regard that as much of a reason for starting to go to church. But the above confusion is no better reason for staying home.
3. TCA and the genetic code
One of the elements of the Grand Evolutionary Scenario is TCA, the
Theory of Common Ancestry, the thesis that life originated at just one
place on earth, all subsequent living creatures being related by descent
to that aboriginal form. This is the claim, as Stephen Gould puts it, that
there is a "tree of evolutionary descent linking all organisms by ties of
genealogy".13 According to TCA, you and I are literally cousins of allliving things-horses, bats, poison ivy and bacteria-distant cousins, no
doubt, but still cousins. It is now rather widely conceded that the fossil
record is not at all what one would expect on the conjunction of TCA
and any presently known candidate-mechanism for evolution. The
record typically displays sudden appearance and subsequent stasis, and
few if any intermediate forms between the major taxa. There are no
intermediary forms in the fossil record leading up to the first representatives of the phyla; and indeed much the same goes at the level of class.
There are few even remotely plausible candidates, in the fossil record,
for intermediates between fish and amphibia, amphibia and reptiles,
reptiles and birds, reptiles and mammals, and the like. 14
Lately, however, it has become popular to pooh-pooh this kind of
consideration, claiming that the really important evidence is to be found
at the molecular level. This evidence has come to light only recently, in
the enormous explosion of information produced by the biochemistry
and molecular biology of the last 30 years or so. In particular, so the
claim goes, the conclusive evidence for TCA is the fact that all forms of
life from the prokaryotes (bacteria, blue-green algae) on up employ the
very same genetic code (the code by which nucleic acid specifies the
structures of proteins). Thus Ernst Mayr:

Everything we have learned about the physiology and chemistry
of organisms supports Darwin's daring speculation that "all the
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organic beings who have ever lived on this earth have descended
from some one primordial form, into which life was first
breathed" (Origin of Species, London, Murray (1964 facsimile edition) p. 484). The discovery that the prokaryotes have the same
genetic code as the higher organisms was the most decisive confirmation of Darwin's hypothesis. A historical unity in the entire
living world cannot help but have a deep meaning for any thinking person and for his feeling toward fellow organisms. lS

But here there is confusion. Given naturalism, this is possibly a just
estimate of the probabilities; that is, if we take naturalism as part of our
background information, then perhaps it is plausible to take a common
genetic code!6 as conclusive evidence for TCA. This is plausible in part
just because (a) it is so hard to see how life could have come into existence at all just by virtue of the regularities studied in physics and chemistry, and (b) if by some wild chance it did arise more than once, it isn't
likely that it would stumble on the same genetic code a second time.
Given theism, however, things are very different. For given theism as
background information, one possibility is TCA, but another is God's
having created some forms of life specially-the original forms, perhaps,
or the first representatives of the phyla, or the first representatives of
some of the classes, or human beings. Christians can't rule this out
merely because some of the experts seem to find the very idea of special
divine creation somehow obscene and worthy only of contempt.
The fact-if indeed it is a fact-that all of life displays the same genetic
code is very much to be expected on TCA and hence confirms it--confirms it in the sense that it raises its antecedent probability. But of course
a common code is perfectly compatible with God's having created some
forms of organic life specially; surely nothing would oblige him to use
different genetic codes for different kinds of life. If special divine creation is one of the possibilities, therefore, the discovery that all forms of
life use the same genetic code couldn't possibly be a "decisive confirmation" of TCA. It raises the antecedent probability of that hypothesis; but
it doesn't by itself raise it high enough for decisive confirmation unless it
lowers the probability of each of the rival hypotheses (and indeed of
their disjunction) to much less than a half. But it doesn't-not, at least,
given theism and the possibility that God would create some forms of life
specially.!7 We can say, I think, that the common code confirms TCA
more than it confirms special creation: that is, it raises the antecedent
probability of TCA more than that of special creation (so far as I can see,
it doesn't raise the latter at all). But of course that doesn't so much as
slyly suggest either that special creation is improbable, given the common code, or that TCA is more probable all told (e.g., given the common
code and the rest of the empirical evidence) than special creation. Mayr
seems to be confusing the probability of TCA on the empirical evidence
plus naturalism with its probability on the empirical evidence alone.
4. Is TCA "Certain"?
Many of the experts tell us that evolution-TCA, at the least-is ccrtain l8
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with respect to the empirical evidence, as certain as that the earth revolves
around the sun rather than vice versa. But (as I argued in 1991a) this seems
to be at best wild exaggeration. There are the problems with the fossil
record: the great gaps and the fact that there aren't any documented or
uncontroversial examples of macro evolution. There is also Mivart's old
objection: 19 as Mivart saw, the mammalian eye (for example) is an extraordinarily complex and functionally integrated structure, its various parts intimately dependent upon each other for their function. He pointed out how
difficult it is to envision a series of organic forms leading up to the eye from
creatures without eyes, where each step on the path through that space
must be both close enough to the preceding step to be plausibly reachable in
a single step, and also adaptive or at any rate not unduly maladaptive.
(Although this objection was one of the first, it has never really been
answered; people have just grown accustomed to living with it.) Indeed, it
isn't really known that such a series is so much as biologically possible.
There is also Michael Behe's new and vastly more powerful version of
Mivart's objection (see below, p. 389).
Here McMullin reminds me that the evidence for TCA is necessarily
incomplete: " ... evolutionary explanation is of its nature historical and
historical explanation is not like explanation in physics or chemistry. It
deals with the singular and the unrepeatable; it is thus necessarily incomplete" (322). This is true, and important; but of course an hypothesis for
which the evidence is necessarily weak is still one for which the evidence
is weak. It is also part of my point; it is (partly) for this reason that it is
absurd to claim that TCA is certain; those strident declarations of certainty must come from some source other than a cool, reasoned, dispassionate look at the evidence. Perhaps these writers have a philosophical
or religious ax to grind, or perhaps they confuse TCA's being the best
available hypothesis (or the best available hypothesis that conforms to
the demands of methodological naturalism) with its being certain; more
likely, perhaps they confuse the epistemic probability of TCA on the
empirical evidence with its probability on that evidence together with
naturalism. Whatever the problem, this assessment of the evidence is
again wholly unsatisfactory from the standpoint of Christian theism; it is
another reason why Christians must make their own estimates here,
rather than blindly following the experts.
There are plenty of other examples from this area. For example, the
famous zoologist G. G. Simpson poses the question "What is man?"; he
answers, ''The point I want to make now is that all attempts to answer that
question before 1859 are worthless and that we will be better off if we
ignore them completely".20 And of course there are many examples from
the social sciences. The great psychologist Jean Piaget asserts that a sevenyear-old child whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly will
believe that everything in the universe has a purpose in some grand overarching plan or design; a mature person whose faculties are functioning properly, however, will learn to "think scientifically" and realize that everything
has either a natural cause or happens by chance. 21 There is also the assumption, widely current in scientific (sociological, psychological) study of religion, that serious religious belief must be a manifestation of pathology, stu-
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pidity, backwardness, or invincible ignorance. And my point is that in
these areas the Christian intellectual community has a stake in noting that
these claims-that human beings are not designed, that the common genetic code decisively confirms TCA, that TCA is certain, and so on-are not at
all established by the empirical evidence. It has a stake in noting the role
that naturalism or other broadly religious views play in the acceptance and
dissemination of these claims. And it should work at some of these areasparticularly in the human sciences but in evolutionary biology as wellfrom the perspective of Christian theism. That is, it should pursue these sciences by starting from the basic tenets of Christianity, taking them as part of
the constant contextual background with respect to which the plausibility
and probability of scientific hypotheses and claims are to be evaluated.
B. Objections to Augustinian Science
Now as far as I can see, McMullin agrees that the Christian community
should pursue something like Augustinian science. He recognizes that there
could indeed be conflict between scientific theories and the deliverances of
the Christian faith, what Christians learn from the Bible; he thinks that "the
context where differences of this kind might properly occur seems restricted
to issues concerning human nature"; and he mentions psychological or psychoanalytical theories that deny "human free choice and the consequent
moral responsibility for actions performed". So perhaps McMullin would
agree that the Christian community needs Augustinian science in these
areas. He is deeply suspicious of this approach, however, in evolutionary
biology and allied areas:
It is this casting of special creation and evolution as rivals in the
domain of cosmological explanation that I find so troubling. If one
assumes that there is a presumption in favor of some sort of special
creation at the critical moments in the historical development of life (a
presumption whose plausibility wanes in regard to specific transitions as the strength of the evolutionary explanation of those transitions increases) one inevitably transforms the field of prehistory into a
battleground where the religious believer is engaged in constant skirmishes with the protagonists of evolutionary-type theories, skirmishes that most often end in forced retreat for the religious believer (313).

Augustinian science, he says,
certainly ensures conflict; it is likely to maximize the strain
between faith and reason, as the believer searches for the expected gaps in the scientific account (p. 313).
Here, I think, there is both misapprehension and error.
1. Faith and Reason.

First, the failure of communication. McMullin believes that pursuing
Augustinian science here "is likely to maximize the strain between faith
and reason". But why so? A strain between faith and reason is a possi-
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bility, of course, only for someone (or some community) that accepts the
Christian faith, and then only if some deliverance of faith is in tension
with some deliverance of reason. So far as I can see, however, the
Christian faith doesn't teach us that TCA is false, and reason doesn't
teach us that it is true. (Maybe reason plus naturalism does, but that is
another matter entirely.) The believer needn't be anxious about TCA, or
desperately eager to refute it. What is clear, from the point of view of
Christian theism, is that the Lord has created the heavens and the earth
and all that is in them; there is no particular way of doing so, however,
such that it is clear that he did it in that way. It is also not clear that he
didn't do so by way of TCA. (Perhaps he did something different and
special in creating our first parents; that is quite compatible with their
having descended from nonhuman forms of life.) As far as I can see, the
proper attitude for Christians to take, towards TCA, is a sort of genial
skepticism; maybe things happened that way, but then again maybe not.
Indeed, as I argued above, it is the naturalist who has a real stake here.
Evolution is the only answer anyone can think of to what would otherwise be a very embarrassing question; it is this that calls forth all those
declarations of certainty.
And hence it is not the case that the believer need spend a lot of time
"searching for the expected gaps in the scientific account", frantically
looking for holes in the latest evolutionary theories. First, of course,
there is no need to go searching for those gaps; the absence of transitional
forms in the fossil record is one of its salient features. But more important, the believer, so far as I can see, has no particular stake in the outcome here. The Augustinian or theistic scientist has a certain freedom
denied her naturalistic compeer: she can follow the evidence where it
leads. If it leads towards TCA, no problem; God could surely have done
things that way if he wished. If it leads away from it, again, no problem;
God could also have done things by way of episodes of special creation,
or in still other ways.22 It is the naturalist who has a real stake in evolution, not the theist. My point is only that in deciding on the right epistemic attitude to take to TCA, Darwinism, and the rest, the Christian scientific community should use all that it knows, including what it knows
by faith. In particular, it should use the idea that it is God who in one
way or another has created life, and he certainly could have done so by
way of episodes of special creation.
So far as I can seen, therefore, Augustinian science doesn't at all
"maximize the strain between faith and reason". Indeed, it should do
just the reverse. In doing Augustinian science, you start by assuming
the deliverances of the faith, employing them along with anything else
you know in dealing with a given scientific problem or project. Conflict
between faith and reason can certainly occur; but it is less likely to occur,
I think, than if the scientific investigation is insulated from the deliverances of the faith and left to develop of its own accord.

2. Academic Trespass?
McMullin points out that Augustinian science crosses contemporary
academic boundaries; the theologian and scientist may find themselves

Faith alld Philosophy

378

at loggerheads, bandying about charges of academic trespass. Given the
present organization of the disciplines, this seems correct: Augustinian
science, at least at first, will certainly involve people's making pronouncements or claims outside their areas of special competence. This is
a real point, and has to be taken with real seriousness; in writing on
these areas, I do myself certainly feel acute discomfort at venturing
beyond the areas where I might be thought to know something about
what I am talking about.
But as things presently stand, this kind of trespass is inevitable, at least if
we propose to think about the broader involvements and significance of a
theory like the Grand Evolutionary Scenario, or Darwinism, or TCA. We
will inevitably stray outside our areas of competence, as Futuyma, Gould
and others do in claiming that contemporary evolutionary theory shows that
human beings are not designed, or as G. G. Simpson does in declaring that
nothing on the nature of man written before 1859 is worth reading. There is
no way to address the important questions here without getting outside our
areas of competence. The alternative would be not to think about these matters-{)r if we think about them, not to speak or write about them. That
seems to me a counsel that is dangerous as well as unduly diffident. The
Christian community needs to know how to think about these matters. We
must address them with all the care, insight and depth we can muster.
Failing to do so will leave us likely to be misled, likely to think, e.g., that
there really is something like a scientific quasi-demonstration that we are not
designed by God, but are rather a product of chance or accident. It will leave
us easily misled into thinking we really must understand what is most
essential about us-love, morality, religion, altruism, art, literature, music,
love of adventure, play, humor, intellectual curiosity, capacity for physics,
philosophy and evolutionary biology-in broadly Darwinian terms. That
way lies intellectual disaster for the Christian community.
And in any event, how can I rationally refrain from using all that I know
in assessing the probability of a theory like TeA, in trying to come to the
proper doxastic attitude towards it? Is it worthy of belief? of disbelief? Or
should we instead be agnostic about it? If the later, how probable is it? Is it
much more or much less probable than its denial? Or is it instead approximately in the same neighborhood? In answering these questions, how can I
sensibly refrain from using all that I know, including what I know by faith?

3. Is Augustinian Science 'Science'?
McMullin displays a certain sympathy with a project somewhere in
the neighborhood of Augustinian science; however he doesn't think the
result should be called 'science' (or perhaps what he thinks is that the
result really isn't science, whatever we call it):
I do not think, however, that theistic science [Augustinian science] should be described as science. It lacks the universality of
science, as that term has been understood in the later Western
tradition. It also lacks the sort of warrant that has gradually
come to characterize a properly "scientific" knowledge of
nature, one that favors systematic observation, generalization,
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and the testing of explanatory hypotheses. Theistic science
appeals to a specifically Christian belief, one that lays no claim
to assent from a Hindu or an agnostic. . ... To use the term science in this connection seems dangerously misleading; it encourages expectations that cannot be fulfilled (303).
Now in a way it doesn't matter what we call this enterprise that (as
McMullin and I agree) ought to be undertaken by the Christian community. And no doubt we would agree further that it is the scientists of the
Christian community, the practitioners of the disciplines in question,
who ought to undertake it. But there is something (research grants, for
example) in a name, and I thoroughly disagree with McMullin's reasons
for denying the name 'science' to this enterprise. He makes two points.
First, Augustinian science, he says, lacks the universality of what is nowadays called 'science'; it couldn't be practiced by an agnostic or a Hindu.
And second, it lacks "the sort of warrant that points to systematic observation, generalization, and the testing of explanatory hypotheses" (303).
But is it really true that what is nowadays called 'science' is universal, in
McMullin's sense? Certainly not. Remember Herbert Simon's account of
rationality and his treatment of altruism;23 no Christian theist could either
accept that account of rationality or (initially) acquiesce in the conclusion
that altruistic behavior is a result of unusual docility and 'limited' rationality?4 Simon's project is surely not universal; it doesn't start from and admit
as premises only propositions everyone--Jew, Christian, Hindu or agnostic-already accepts or is prepared to accept. Not by a long shot. Similarly
for the claims that a common genetic code is decisive evidence for TCA, for
the claim that current evolutionary science supports the conclusion that
human beings are not designed by God, for the Piagettian claim that the
mature person realizes that everything has either a natural cause or else
happens by chance, for the assumption that serious religious belief is pathological or a result of stupidity, unusual backwardness, or social disorder,
and the like. All of these claims are assumed or accepted in one scientific
project or another-i.e., in one or another project to which the term 'science'
is commonly applied; but none of them is universal in McMullin's sense. I
conclude that McMullin is mistaken here: the term 'science' is not currently
used in such a way that it applies only to projects universal in that sense;
hence we don't have here an objection to applying the term 'science' to
Augustinian science.
As for the second point (that Augustinian science wouldn't involve
observation, generalization and the testing of hypotheses characteristic
of science) here there is misunderstanding. The way to try to understand, from a theistic perspective, how God created plants and animals
and human beings is to take account of all that you know: what you
know by faith, what you know as a Christian, as well as what you know
in other ways. In the case at hand, the relevant considerations would be
what, if anything, Scripture teaches or suggests on the matter, together
with the antecedent probability of, e.g., TeA from a theistic perspective,
together with the 'empirical evidence': the fossil record, the molecular
evidence, homologies, and the like. Clearly this involves precisely the
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sort of systematic observation, generalization and testing of explanatory
hypotheses that McMullin cites as the hallmark of science. It may
involve more; but it certainly involves this much. To establish his point,
McMullin would have to argue something else: that science (properly
so-called) somehow couldn't involve those other matters, the looking to
see what (if anything) Scripture says on the matter, the consideration of
the antecedent probability of a theory on theism and so on. And I
haven't the faintest idea how that could be argued. Where is it laid
down that anything that does that is not science?
The answer, McMullin thinks, lies in the methodological naturalism he
thinks essential to natural science: the idea, to put it crudely, that in science we ought not to appeal to what we know about God, or his activity,
or to what we know by way of the testimony of Scripture.25 Speaking of
methodological naturalism, he writes, "Scientists have to proceed in this
way; the methodology of natural science gives no purchase on the claim
that a particular event or type of event is to be explained by invoking
God's 'special' action or calling on the testimony of Scripture" (303). But
where does this embargo come from? It is ordinarily supported only by
bad arguments of the type "God is not part of the universe; in science
we can only refer to parts of the universe; therefore .... "; or even "To
refer to God in science is to treat God as an object, which is idolatry;
therefore .... " Why believe that scientists have to proceed the way
McMullin says they have to?
Consider, for example, the question how life originated: theists know
that God created it in one way or another, and now the question is: how
did he do it? Did he do it by way of the ordinary regularities or laws of
physics and chemistry (the ordinary behavior of matter, so far as we
understand it) or did he do something special? If, after considerable
study, we can't see how it could possibly have happened by way of
those regularities-if, as is in fact the case, after many decades of study
the enormous complexity and functional connectedness and integrity of
even the simplest forms of life make it look increasingly unlikely that
they could have originated in that way-the natural thing to think, from
the perspective of Christian theism, is that probably God did something
different and special here. (Such a conclusion, of course, would not be
written in stone. All we can say is that it is likely with respect to our present evidence; perhaps things will change; the inquiry is never closed.)
And why couldn't one draw this conclusion precisely as a scientist?
Where is it written that such a conclusion can't be part of science? Why
should we accept methodological naturalism?

4. Duhemian Science
Pierre Duhem has an interesting answer26-the best answer I know.
Duhem was both a serious Catholic and a serious scientist; he was
accused (as he saw it) by Abel Rey27 of allowing his religious and metaphysical views as a Christian to enter his physics in an improper way.
Duhem rejected the accusation, claiming that his Christianity didn't
enter his physics in an improper way, because it didn't enter his physics
in any way at alUR Furthermore, he thought the correct or proper way to
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pursue physical theory was the way in which he claimed to have done
it; physical theory should be completely independent of religious or
metaEhysical views or commitments. Why so? Fundamentally, he
says, Y because otherwise the disagreements that run riot in metaphysics
will ingress into physics, so that the latter cannot be an activity we can
all work at together, regardless of our metaphysical views:
Now to make physical theories depend on metaphysics is surely
not the way to let them enjoy the privilege of universal consent.
. . .. If theoretical physics is subordinated to metaphysics, the
divisions separating the diverse metaphysical systems will
extend into the domain of physics. A physical theory reputed to
be satisfactory by the sectarians of one metaphysical school will
be rejected by the partisans of another school.
The point he makes is that if a physical theorist employs metaphysical
assumptions that are not accepted by other workers in the field, and
employs them in such a way that those who don't accept them can't
accept his physical theory, then to that extent his work cannot be accepted by those others; and to that extent the cooperation important to science will be compromised. He therefore proposes a conception of science (of physics in particular) according to which the latter is independent of metaphysics:
... I have denied metaphysical doctrines the right to testify for
or against any physical theory. .... Whatever I have said of
the method by which physics proceeds, or the nature and scope
that we must attribute to the theories it constructs, does not in
any way prejudice either the metaphysical doctrines or religious
beliefs of anyone who accepts my words. The believer and the
nonbeliever may both work in common accord for the progress
of physical science such as I have tried to define it (p. 274-75).
So here we have another argument against Augustinian science and for
methodological naturalism, an argument with an appealing simplicity: it is
important that we all-Christian, naturalist, agnostic, whoever-be able to
work at physics and the other sciences together and cooperatively; therefore we shouldn't employ, in science, views, commitments and assumptions only some of us accept. But then we can't employ (in that way) such
ideas as that the world and the things therein have been designed and created by God; that is a commitment only some of us accept. Proper science,
insofar as it is to be common to all of us, will have to eschew any dependence upon metaphysical and religious views held by only some of us;
therefore we should endorse methodological naturalism. We do not, of
course, have to be metaphysical naturalists in order to pursue Duhemian science; but if science is to be properly universal, it can't employ assumptions
or commitments that are not universally shared.
This argument is pragmatic, not principial: it is a good thing to do science together; we should therefore maximize the possibility of coopera-
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tion and cooperative inquiry wherever possible; therefore we should not
employ, in science, theories or assumptions essentially involving beliefs
that are not common to us all. Duhemian science, you might say, would
be public science; it would be maximally inclusive and wholly neutral
with respect to the world-view differences that separate us. And of
course there are vast stretches of our cognitive economy where these
world-view considerations do indeed seem to be quite irrelevant.
Anyone with decent eyesight will see that the pointer points to 7; metaphysics and theology have nothing to do with it. The same will hold for
a measurement of the distance from Earth to Jupiter. Anybody (with the
possible exception of a few paralogicians from Australia) will see that a
contradiction can't be true; again, it doesn't matter whether you are theist, naturalist, anti-realist or whatever. The same will go for a deduction
of Cantor's Theorem from the axioms of ordinary set theory. (Of course
disagreement may break out about those axioms.)
Duhemian science, obviously enough, would involve methodological
naturalism: no hypotheses involving God, or sin, or what one knows by
special revelation will enter essentially into the constitution of such science. But here is the crucially important point: from the Duhemian
point of view, methodological naturalism will be just one small part of a
much more inclusive constraint. Science, so conceived, will not employ
hypotheses about God, but it also won't employ any hypotheses whose
cogency involves or presupposes metaphysical naturalism. Nor will it employ
assumptions like those that seem to underlie much cognitive science. It
couldn't, for example, properly assume that mind-body dualism is false,
or that human beings are material objects, these being metaphysical
assumptions that divide us. Nor could it employ the deterministic
assumptions that seem to underlie much social science; these beliefs also
relevantly divide us. Further, many assumptions about what constitutes
proper function on the part of human beings and their faculties would
have to be proscribed: for example, Simonian assumptions about what is
and isn't rational, Piagettian claims about what a mature (and properly
functioning) adult will believe, as well as the assumption that serious
religious belief must be explained as a manifestation of pathology, stupidity or invincible ignorance. Further, Duhemian science would proscribe the idea that the Theory of Common Ancestry is certain, as well as
the idea that the randomness or chance involved in genetic variation is
such as to preclude human beings' having been designed-by God or
anyone else. It is important to see how much of what goes on under the
title of science is not Duhemian.
Duhemian science has much to be said for it and should surely be
encouraged. But what about those who, like Simon, for example, think
it is important also to do a sort of human science which starts, not merely from methodological naturalism, but from metaphysical naturalism?
And what about those who, like Duhem's atomists, Cartesians and
Aristotelians, think it is important to pursue a sort of science in which
the aim is successful explanation in terms of underlying unobservable
realities? And what about Christians or theists, who propose to investigate human reality employing all that they know, including what they
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know as Christians or theists? So far as Duhem's claims go, there is
nothing in the least improper about any of this. Should we call this kind
of activity 'science'; does it deserve that honorific term? There is no reason in Duhem for a negative answer. It is important, to be sure, to see
that science of this sort isn't Duhemian science and doesn't have the
claim to universal assent enjoyed by the latter; but of course that is nothing against it. According to the fuller Duhemian picture, then, we
would all work together on Duhemian science; but each of the groups
involved-naturalists and theists, for example, but perhaps others as
well-could then go on to incorporate Duhemian science into a fuller
context that includes the metaphysical or religious principles specific to
that group. The motivation for doing so, naturally enough, will vary
from area to area. Physics, and chemistry are overwhelmingly
Duhemian (of course the same isn't true for philosophy of physics); here
perhaps Augustinian science would be for the most part otiose.
Something similar goes for biological sciences: surely much that goes on
there could be thought of as Duhemian science, although that area also
contains the non-Duhemian elements we have already noted. In the
human sciences, however, vast stretches are clearly non-Duhemian; it is
in these areas that Augustinian science would be most relevant and
important.
So return to the current question: should the Christian scientific community observe the constraints of methodological naturalism? So far as
this argument is concerned, the answer seems to be: yes, of course, in
those areas where Duhemian science is possible and valuable. But nothing here suggests that the Christian scientific community should not also
pursue non-Duhemian Augustinian science where that is relevant.
There is nothing here to suggest that if it ain't Duhemian, it ain't science.
II Probabilities: Antecedent and Consequent

A. God: Classicist or Romantic?
The antecedent probability of a thesis or hypothesis, for you, is its
epistemic probability 30 on your background information, prior to or
independent of consideration of the particular evidence at hand. I
argued that the antecedent probability of evolution with respect to naturalism is very different from its antecedent probability with respect to
Christian theism; in fact, T said, the antecedent probability of TCA, for
the Christian theist, is less than that of its denial. Here McMullin digs in
his heels; here, he says, is where he and I "really part ways".
In order to address this issue properly, we need a couple of distinctions. First, suppose we use the phrase 'The Grand Evolutionary Scenario'
(GES) to denote the conjunction of four theses: (a) the 'Naturalistic Origins
Thesis' according to which life arose from non life just by way of the regularities of physics and chemistry, (b) the 'Progress Thesis', according to
which life has progressed from relatively simple unicellular forms3! to relatively complex forms, culminating, as we human beings like to think, in
us, (c) TCA, according to which life originated at one place on earth, all
subsequent living creatures being related by descent to those aboriginal
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creatures, and (d) Darwinism, the claim that these enormous changes
occurred by way of the accretion of many small steps and that the mechanisms driving the enormous changes occurring since the origin of life are
broadly Darwinian (for starters, natural selection working on some source
of variation such as random genetic mutation).
Now the epistemic probability of a theory such as CES or TCA is of
course relative to a body of background belief or knowledge. I argued
that the antecedent probability of CES on naturalism is high. For the
naturalist, evolution is the only game in town, the only answer anyone
can think of to the questions, Where did this teeming variety of flora and
fauna come from? How did it get here? And what accounts for that
appearance of design it displays? The theist has an easy answer: in one
way or another, the Lord created all these creatures (why else are they
called 'creatures'?). But that answer is not available to the naturalist; it is
CES that gives an answer to this otherwise embarrassing question.
Hence Richard Dawkins' remark to A. J. Ayer at one of those elegantly
candle-lit and splendidly bibulous Oxford college dinners: he said he
couldn't imagine being an atheist before 1859 (the year Darwin's Origin
of Species was published); "although atheism might have been logically
tenable before Darwin", said he, "Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist".32 I doubt that it is possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist, but Dawkins' essential point is right: CES is a reasonably plausible answer to the above question, and the only reasonably
plausible answer anyone can think of. For the serious naturalist, therefore, evolution is an absolutely essential plank in his platform; and
hence the antecedent probability of evolution, given philosophical naturalism, is high. It is this, I take it, that is in part responsible for those triumphal cries of certainty (above, pp. 0000).
Then I went on to argue that (because of the improbability of the
Naturalistic Origins Thesis) the probability of CES with respect to
Christian theism and the empirical evidence is very low, and the probability of TCA with respect to that same body is perhaps somewhat less
than that of its denial, i.e., less than 1/2. I argued this by claiming first
that the antecedent probability (its probability independent of the
empirical evidence) of TCA is perhaps (judgments of this kind are of
course necessarily infirm) less than 1/2; I then went on to say that when
we add the empirical evidence, things don't change; on theism and the
empirical evidence, TCA is still somewhat less probable than its denial.
Now why should we think the antecedent probability of TCA on
Christian theism is less than 1/2? First, according to Christian theism,
Cod is constantly at work in his universe. He is in constant, close, intimate causal contact with his creation, supporting and upholding it in
being: were it not for this constant upholding activity, the cosmos would
disappear like a candle flame in a high wind. Second, most Christians
hold that Cod has frequently treated the things he has made in unusual
and special ways: water turns into wine, human beings emerge unhurt
from a fiery furnace and are miraculously cured of disease; and above all,
there is the wondrous splendor of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ. Apparently, therefore, Cod is not averse to working in his creation
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in special ways. But then, so I said, there is no particular antecedent probability in favor of the idea that he wouldn't do anything different or special in the creation of life, say, or in the creation of special kinds of life. So
it is hard to see how there is any antecedent probability in favor of GES,
and hard to see that there is any antecedent probability in favor of TCA.
Indeed, if God acts specially over one large and important range of his
interaction with his creatures, isn't it a bit more probable than not that he
would act specially over other large and important ranges?
So I'm inclined to think the antecedent probability of TCA with
respect to Christian theism is a bit less than 1/2. But we still have to factor in what we know about the origin of life; and with respect to
Christian theism and the present evidence, the Naturalistic Origins
Thesis seems extremely improbable. As modern biochemistry reveals,
the simplest forms of life display an astonishing, stunning complexity, a
complicated interrelatedness and functional integrity that boggles the
mind. According to Francis Crick, life must be regarded as the next
thing to a miracle; according to Harold P. Kein of Santa Clara
University, chairman of a National Academy of Sciences committee that
recently reviewed origin-of-life research, "The simplest bacterium is so
damn complicated from the point of view of a chemist that it is almost
impossible to imagine how it happened."33 It therefore looks as if God
did something different and special in the creation of life. 34 (Of course
things may change; that is how things look now.) These things taken
together suggest that the Lord might very well have done something different and special, not only in creating life in the first instance, but also
in creating certain subsequent forms of life. If he did something special
in creating life, what would prevent him from doing something special
at other points in his great creation drama, perhaps creating specially
the original representatives of some of the phyla, or human beings, or
still other forms of life? It would seem entirely in character. I am therefore inclined to maintain my suggestion that the antecedent probability
of TCA, from a theistic point of view, is perhaps a bit less than 1/2.
Now McMullin is especially inclined to dispute my claims about the
antecedent probability of TCA. He makes initial heavy weather over the
very asking of the question what God is likely to do; if I understand him,
however, he goes on to claim that in fact it is unlikely, indeed very
unlikely, that God would do something special and different, or create
something specially in bringing it about that there are human beings, or
certain kinds of plants and animals, or even, presumably, life itself:
To carry the argument a stage further: what would the eloquent texts of
Genesis, Job, Isaiah and the Psalms, lead one to expect? What have theologians made of these texts? This is obviously a theme that far transcends
the compass of an essay such as this one. I can make a couple of simple
points. The Creator whose powers are gradually revealed in these texts
is omnipotent and all-wise, far beyond the reach of human reckoning.
His Providence extends to all His creatures; they are all part of His single
plan, only a fragment of which we know, and that darkly. Would such a
Being be likely to "intervene" in the cosmic process, that is, deal in two
different manners with it? (Let me emphasize that I am uncomfortable
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with this language of "likelihood" in regard to God's actions, as though
we were somehow capable of catching the Creator of the galactic universe in the nets of our calculations.) Why should an omnipotent God
not create a universe in which God's ends with regard to all creatures
except humans would be achieved in a natural way? If one may use the
language of antecedent probability at all here-and I am not at all certain
that one may-it surely must point away from special creation."
A couple of comments on this passage: first, the issue is not, of course,
whether there is some way to calculate the probability that God would
do this or that; at best, on a topic like that, we have little more than
crude guesses. And I applaud McMullin's implicit suggestion that any
ideas we might have about the antecedent likelihood of God's doing this
or that should be at best tentative. I think it a bit more probable that
God would do something different and special in the creation of life,
and human beings, and perhaps some other forms of life; but any such
views, surely, should be tentative and held with appropriate diffidence.
It certainly befits no one to be at all cocksure here.
This said, however, I fail to see any force in the considerations
McMullin puts forward. God is indeed omnipotent and all-wise; his
providence does indeed extend to all creatures; and indeed we know but
a fragment of his total plan. These things are true; but how do they bear
on the question whether God would or would not, for example, create in
stages: first creating inanimate material, say, then later doing something
special in creating life, perhaps, and then still later in creating human
life? (It is part of the major theistic religions to think that God has created humankind in his own image; might he not have thought it appropriate to create human life in a special way, by way of an act of special creation?) We know, after all, that God is not averse to acting in special
ways, as the many miracles recorded in the Bible attest.
McMullin seems to think of God as like a classical artist, devoted to
ideals of simplicity, and elegance, economy and restraint. But why think
of Him like that? Perhaps God is more like a romantic artist with limitless resources, extravagant, prolific, fecund, overflowing with uproarious creative activity, disdaining restraint and economy of action. (The
millions of species that have become extinct would be examples of this
exuberant fertility.) After all, what are the attractions of economy for
Him? Creatures limited in energy, power and time have need for economy; God suffers from no such limitations. Is it instead the idea that
God's interest in economy of effort is a matter of aesthetic preference?
But is there even the slightest reason to think so? The Lord constantly
acts in his creation; apart from his upholding activity, it would disappear like a puff of smoke; why would he think it beneath his dignity, or
aesthetically unpleasant, or otherwise disagreeable to take a hand in his
creation in other ways? Perhaps he is very much a hands-on God.
Perhaps he marks various important transitions and junctures in the history of his creation by special celebratory or ceremonial activity of some
sort. Perhaps an example of this sort of activity is his creating certain
kinds of life specially, thus symbolically marking the importance of the
transition. "Are not sparrows two for a penny? Yet without your
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Father's leave," says Jesus, "not one of them can fall to the ground." If
the Lord's creation scheme is such that his leave is needed for a sparrow
to fall, might he not have created various forms of life-perhaps even
sparrows-specially? Why not?
So my claim is that the antecedent probability of episodes of special
creation with respect to Christian theism but prior to the empirical evidence-i.e., the evidence bearing on TCA-is a bit greater than 1/2.
McMullin, by contrast, insists that salvation history tells us nothing
about natural history. What God does with respect to salvation gives us
no probabilities with respect to special creation:
The story of salvation is a story about men and women, about
the burden of being human. . .. The biblical account of God's
dealing with humankind provides no warrant whatever for supposing that God would have brought the ancestors of the various kinds of plants and animals to be outside the ordinary order
of nature ( p. 324).
The reason seems to be that the story of salvation is "about free beings
who sinned and who therefore needed God's intervention. Dealing with
the human predicament 'naturally' so to speak would not have been sufficient"(p.324). Here McMullin suggests that God would perhaps have
preferred to deal with the human predicament without doing something
unusual, but that wasn't possible; he therefore had to act specially.
Since he wasn't thus constrained when it came to creation, however, his
acting specially in salvation history doesn't make it any more probable
that he would do so in creation.
But how do we know that God was somehow obliged to act specially in
salvation history? This seems to be a new theological idea; like most original theological ideas, it warrants suspicion. What is our source of information as to God's constraints here? In any event, he certainly wasn't
obliged to act specially so oftell in salvation history. According to Catholic
doctrine, a miracle occurs whenever the mass is properly celebrated; on
nearly all Christian views, God regularly guides and directs his people
individually and his church collectively by virtue of the work of the Holy
Spirit in the believer's heart;36 each of these acts is special in the relevant
sense. And so far as the "ordinary order of nature" is concerned, on the
views both of John Calvin and Pope Pius XII (and in the face of fire power
like that, who am I to demur?), God creates specially a new human soul or
person whenever a human being comes into existence. If so, the order of
nature regularly and ordinarily involves very many acts of special divine
creation; at present the rate would be about 3 such acts per second. Some
Christians might reject Pius' and Calvin's claim, but presumably not on
the grounds that God has an aversion to acts of special creation.
Of course these are deep and difficult waters. I am inclined to think
the antecedent probabilities slightly favor episodes of special creation;
but I can certainly see the attractions of agnosticism here. Perhaps the
most reasonable attitude is one of agnosticism: one just doesn't know
what these antecedent probabilities are. What seems to me unreason-
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able, however, is to be confident that antecedent probability favors TeA
or CES. And if 1 am right, then we must rely most heavily, here, on the
empirical evidence. 37
B. The Empirical Evidence
Turning briefly and finally to that empirical evidence, there are a couple of points that need to be made. (I must caution you that neither
McMullin nor I can claim any expertise with respect to the empirical evidence; all we know is what we read in the papers. Think of each of the
following sentences as prefaced by "I'm no expert, but ... ") McMullin
writes as if the theistic skeptic with respect to evolution is fighting a sort
of desperate rearguard action, with a succession of new and powerful
pieces of evidence ever compelling further retreat, as one major gap after
another is closed, one major transition after another definitively nailed
down. And it isn't only McMullin who thinks this; there is a sort of
widespread impression, a kind of widely shared but uncritical assumption, among academics who view the subject from a certain distance,
that these major gaps and transitions are in fact steadily closing, or at
least narrowing.
But where are all these gaps being closed by further discoveries?
They are not easy to find. As McMullin points out, the fossil record contains many sequences of extinct forms (e.g., trilobites) "where the development of specific anatomical features can be traced in detail through
the rock layers" (315). This is indeed so, but does not bear on the main
problems for TeA with the fossil record, which have to do with the lack,
in that record, of sequences of intermediary forms between the really
major taxa-phyla and classes, for example. 38 "As new fossil evidence is
uncovered," he says, (315) "paleontologists continue to uncover stage
after stage in crucial linking: forms such as the therapsids, for example,
the forms that related reptiles with the earliest mammals." This is misleading exaggeration. It suggests that paleontologists have discovered
and continue to discover many forms that link, say, fish with amphibia,
amphibia with reptiles, reptiles with birds, or reptiles with mammals.
But so far as 1 know, this is not so. So far as 1 know, therapsids are the
only candidates for a link between reptiles and mammals (and they have
been known for a long time). Although there is some controversy about
the therapsids, perhaps they really could be thought of as something like
a linking forms between reptiles and mammals;39 but if TeA were true,
one would expect vastly many more such forms. Furthermore,
Archaeopteryx, known since shortly after Darwin's death and formerly
the only serious candidate for a similar post linking reptiles and birds,
has according to some been demoted by the discovery of modern birds
antedating it. And things stand no better with respect to those other
major gaps.
In fact it looks as if the shoe is on the other foot. "When I think of the
eye," Darwin said, "I shudder". He was thinking of the enormous complexity of the eye, and the strain involved in believing that an instrument of that delicate interrelatedness and functional integrity could
have evolved by anything like the mechanisms he suggested. Perhaps
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he was also thinking of Mivart's specific objections (above, pp. 375). But
Darwin had no idea at all of the true complexity of the visual system;'O if
he shuddered at what he knew then, he would have quaked uncontrollably had he known what we know now.
Secondly, Mivart's worry returns in spades when we think of "irreducible complexity". According to Michael Behe)1 the cilium (used by
many kinds of cells for swimming) is composed of some six molecules.
All six are required for the cilium's function; if any is absent, no ciliary
function is possible. Cilia, says Behe, are "irreducibly complex"; in that
we can't envision any simpler forms that will carry out the cilium's function. In the case of Mivart's eye, we can certainly envision some intermediate forms; the problem is that it is hard to see how there could be the
required complete series. (There is also the fact that it isn't really known
that such a series is even biologically possible.) With the cilium, however, we can't envisage any members of a series of functional precursors at
all. Still further, says Behe, this example of irreducible complexity is
only one of several; there is also, for example, the system that targets
proteins for delivery to subcellular compartments, as well as aspects of
blood clotting, closed circular DNA, electron transport, the bacterial flagellum, telomeres, photosynthesis, and still other structures.
Thirdly, in Darwin's day it was possible to attribute the failure to find
intermediate forms between the major taxa to the fact that the fossil record
was largely unexplored. Since Darwin's day, however, the number of fossils discovered and catalogued has increased a hundredfold; it is no longer
possible (or at any rate plausible) to make that excuse, and the gaps are at
least as great as ever. Lots of series with some modification have been
found, as with trilobites; the great gaps, however, remain.
Fourth, there is the gap between life and nonlife; as we have seen, this
gap has greatly widened since Darwin's day.
Fifth, there is the Cambrian explosion. The fossil record displays unicellular life going all the way back, so they tell us, to 3 or 3.5 billion
years ago-only a billion years or so after the formation of the earth
itself and much less than a billion years after the earth cooled sufficiently to permit life. There is no fossil record of skeletal animals until about
530 million years ago, 2.5 or 3 billion years after the appearance of unicellular life. Then there is a veritable explosion of invertebrate life, a riot
of shapes and anatomical designs, with ancestors of the major contemporary forms and all the marine invertebrate phyla represented, together
with a lot of forms wholly alien in the contemporary context. 42 None of
this was known in Darwin's day, and would surely have given him
pause. And now in a recent issue of Science we learn that the time during which this explosion took place was much shorter than previously
thought; it all happened during a period of no more than 5 or 10 million
years,"3 a period that seems much too short to accommodate such furious
evolutionary creativity, at least with respect to any known mechanisms. 44 On balance, it is likely that if Darwin knew what we now know
about the complexity of such organs as the mamallian eye and the
human brain, the enormous intricacy revealed by biochemistry and molecular biology (including the astonishing complexity of the simplest
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forms of life), the Cambrian explosion, the lack of closure in the fossil
record, and so on, he would have been neither a Darwinian nor a devotee of TCA.
For a Christian, therefore, one who is not shackled by the demands of
naturalism, the right attitude towards TCA is one of a certain cordial
skepticism. TCA is a very pretty theory with many of the so-called theoretical virtues; it has been a fine source of research projects; incorporated
into God's great drama of creation and Incarnation as in McMullin's
concluding peroration, it is attractive. It doesn't follow, however, that it
is true, nor even that it is more likely than not. 4S
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